Moneyball by Michael Lewis

This book is, essentially, about Billy Beane's approach to constructing baseball teams. Beane, the GM for the Oakland A's, rejected classic scouting and player selection ideas and used statistics to determine which players to select. To maximize offense, you want to get guys with good on-base percentages (OBP) and high slugging percentages (SLG). Stats people commonly point to, like stolen bases and batting average, weren't good indicators of a team's offensive success. And, while both OBP and SLG are important, it was found that a small rise in OBP was much more helpful than a similar rise in SLG. How many runs do you score in an inning if you have an OBP of 1.000? What if you have an SLG of 1.000? Additionally, obtaining above average OBP guys was typically less costly than obtaining guys with high SLG. So, the most economical way of building a successful offensive team is by chasing down people who don't make outs. Seems pretty easy to figure out.

But, in essence, that's the origin of the book. What seems reasonably easy to figure out wasn't figured out in a timely manner. Why were the A's able to win with a limited payroll when all the other "small-market" teams were constantly floundering and rebuilding? Okay, so the Twins were doing pretty well, too. Unfortunately, in recent years the A's haven't enjoyed the same success they did early in the decade. But, is this because Billy Beane's management strategies aren't good for the long-haul? Or, is it because people like Beane have been popping up in front offices around baseball in the years since? Building a team, you want to maximize the return on the investment. Now, the Yankees can get away with spending $1.5 million (or more) for every win because they have deep pockets. If the A's spend $1.5 million for every win ... they'll wind up winning less than 25% of their games. They need to be in the $0.5 million per win ballpark to compete for a playoff spot (or something like that). When the A's were the only team that wanted Scott Hatteberg, they were able to get him very cheaply. But, if the A's, Blue Jays, Red Sox, etc. all want Hatteberg for the same qualities, he's not going to come as cheaply. And, in all likelihood, the A's won't end up getting him because the other teams that are employing the same principles have more resources at their disposal. So, along with having less teams to steal players from, there are more teams trying to get their hands on the same players the A's are. That's not good for business.

In fact, if the A's were still alone in their way of attacking the problem (as they were at one time), Kevin Youkilis would now be in Oakland wearing green instead of starring in Boston.

But, while Moneyball is a book about baseball, it's also a book about not being a moron! The bigger theme is that doing something because that's how it's always been done is really stupid if it's not the best way to do something ... and especially stupid if it doesn't work. And, furthermore, it might be good to use the information available to you to try to figure out if there is a better way to do something. Ask questions. Formulate hypotheses. Test them!

Moneyball is well-written and I especially like some of the inane things people wrote and said about Beane, his ideas, and the book that are included in my copy (which was published the year after the original came out). He's a few lines about some Joe Morgan commentary from pp 271-272:

The man who spoke for all insiders was Joe Morgan ... At some point during each game (of a playoff series) Morgan explained to the audience the flaw in the A's thinking ... When the A's lost the first game, 7-5, it gave Morgan his opening to explain, in the first inning of the second game, why the Oakland A's were in trouble. 'You have to manufacture runs in the postseason,' he said, meaning bunt and steal and in general treat outs as something other than a scarce resource. Incredibly, he then went on to explain that 'manufacturing runs' was how the New York Yankees had beaten the Anaheim Angels the night before.

I had seen that game. Down 5-4 in the eighth inning, Yankees second baseman Alfonso Soriano had gotten himself on base and stolen second. Derek Jeter then walked, and Jason Giambi singled in Soriano. Bernie Williams then hit three-run homer. A reasonable person, examining that sequence of events, says, 'Whew, thank God Soriano didn't get caught stealing; it was, in retrospect, a stupid risk that could have killed the whole rally.' Joe Morgan looked at it and announced that Soriano stealing second, the only bit of 'manufacturing' in the production line, was the cause. Amazingly, Morgan concluded that day's lesson about baseball strategy by saying, 'You sit and wait for a three-run homer, you're still going to be sitting there.'

But the wonderful thing about this little lecture was what happened right under Joe Morgan's nose, as he was giving it ... Eric Chavez hit a three-run homer. And Joe Morgan's lecture on the need to avoid playing for the three-run homer just rolled right along, as if the play on the field had not dramatically contradicted every word that had just come out of his mouth.

I didn't really need to read Moneyball ... but I'm glad I finally did.